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Robert Lucas is rightfully credited with having changed the course of macroeconomic theory. 
The  aim  of  this  paper  is  to  document  his  transformation  from  a  potential  contributor  to 
Keynesian  macroeconomics  to  the  master  builder  of  an  alternative  paradigm,  equilibrium 
macroeconomics. I reconstruct Lucas’s theoretical journey as involving seven steps: (1) his 
pre-macroeconomic years, (2) his early work as a macroeconomist, jointly with Rapping, (3) 
the ‘Expectations and the Neutrality of Money’ 1972 article, (4) his inaugural equilibrium 
model of the business cycle, (5) his all-out attack on Keynesian macroeconomics, (6) the 
passing of the baton to Kydland and Prescott, and (7) his standpoint after the victory of the 
approach he so much contributed to launch. 
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A first version of this paper was presented at seminars given at the University of Toronto and the University of 
British  Columbia.  The  author  is  grateful  to  the  participants  at  these  seminars  for  their  remarks.  He  also 
acknowledges his gratitude to Robert Lucas for having authorized him to quote from the Lucas Archives held at 
Duke  University,  as  well  as for  his  comments  on  the  paper.  Kevin  Hoover’s  vivid  comments  on  an  earlier 
version were also stimulating.     1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
In  the  late  1970s  and  the  beginning  of  the  1980s,  macroeconomics  underwent  a  radical 
change,  which  resulted  in  the  overthrow  of  Keynesian  IS-LM  macroeconomics  and  its 
replacement  by  dynamic  stochastic  general-equilibrium  macroeconomics.  While  such 
transformations are always collective enterprises, it is nonetheless widely accepted that one 
person, Robert Lucas, played a pivotal role in the change.  
The aim of my paper is to ponder upon this revolution, if it may be called so.
1 Its originality 
with  respect  to  most  other  works  on  the  subject  (Blanchard,  2000;  Laidler,  2010; 
Leijonhufvud, 2006; Hoover, 1988; 2003; Snowdon and Vane, 2005; Woodford, 1999) is that 
it adopts an indirect way of looking at the transformation, since my purpose is to assess 
Lucas’s  own  account  of  what  caused  him  to  change  “from  an  attempted  contributor  to 
Keynesian macroeconomics to that of severe critic…” (Lucas, 1981a, p. 2).
 To this end, I base 
my argument on the numerous articles in which Lucas explained his intellectual journey: his 
introduction to the Studies in Business Cycle Theory volume (Lucas, 1981a) and the various 
methodological papers contained in that volume; his Professional Memoir (Lucas, 2001); his 
‘My Keynesian Years’ (2004) lecture; and the numerous interviews where he commented on 
his own work (Klamer, 1984; The Region, 1993; Snowdon and Vane, 1998; Usubiaga Ibanez, 
1999; McCallum, 1999).
2 Another important source of information is the Lucas archives held 
at Duke University Rare Book, Manuscript, and Special Collections Library (Lucas, various).  
The  paper  comprises  seven  parts,  each  concerned  with  one  stage  or  facet  of  Lucas’s 
intellectual journey: (1) his pre-macroeconomist years; (2) the beginnings of Lucas’s interest 
in macroeconomics (the 1969 Lucas-Rapping paper); (3) rational expectations and general 
equilibrium (the 1972 ‘Expectations and the Neutrality of Money’ article); (4) his inaugural 
equilibrium model of the business cycle; (5) his all-out attack on Keynesian macroeconomics; 
(6) the passing of the baton to Kydland and Prescott; (7) and Lucas’s standpoint after the 
victory.  
The purpose of this paper is to document Lucas’s intellectual tranformation, rather than to 
critically assess his contribution. When presenting this paper in seminars, I have observed 
how divisive a figure Lucas remains. Some of the audience, those who leant towards Keynes, 
recoiled whenever I said anything positive about Lucas and rejoiced in any statements they 
saw as negative, the opposite being true for those who tended to side with Lucas. For my part, 
I hope that the members of neither camp will end up considering me as one of them, when 
                                                 
1 Lucas rejects the description of the change as a scientific revolution. For this reason, I have adopted the more 
neutral term of ‘transformation’ in the title of this article. 
2 Fischer (1996) gives a balanced assessment of Lucas’s contribution to macroeconomics.   2 
they read this paper. In my opinion, a good historian of economics should remain above the 
fray.  
 
1. Lucas’s pre-macroeconomist years 
Having majored in history at the University of Chicago, Lucas started his graduate studies in 
history at Berkeley. In his Professional Memoir, he recounts that, while writing an essay on 
19
th century British business cycles for a course in economic history, he came to realize that 
he needed some economic background (which he totally lacked) to understand the subject 
fully. This led him to abandon history and shift to economics, not at Berkeley, “where the 
economic department was not encouraging”, but back in Chicago (2001, p. 6). To make up for 
his lack of economic education, he taught himself by reading Samuelson’s Foundations of 
Economic Analysis. It fascinated him. Love at first sight! 
I loved the Foundations. Like so many others in my cohort, I internalized its view that if 
I couldn’t formulate a problem in economic theory mathematically, I didn’t know what I 
was doing. I came to the position that mathematical analysis is not one of the many 
ways of doing economic theory: it is the only way. Economic theory is mathematical 
analysis. Everything else is just pictures and talk (Lucas, 2001, p. 9). 
This put Lucas on the track on which he would remain for the rest of his life, but it also led 
him away from the Chicago tradition because, in Lucas’s terms, Marshall was “the god of 
Chicago economics” (2001, p. 8). In contrast, Lucas’s fascination with mathematical theory à 
la Samuelson tilted him towards Walras, an economist who was not popular in Chicago, 
castigated as he was by Friedman, the major figure in Chicago economics at the time. Lucas, 
frequently expressed his admiration for Friedman as an economist and a teacher, as well as a 
historian of monetary theory. Friedman and Lucas also shared the same vision of economic 
policy and the role of the state. But in their appreciation of Walras and Marshall, they were 
poles apart.
3  
In  a  letter  to  Driscoll,  dated  November  23,  1977,  Lucas  wrote  “I  am  a  hopeless  ‘neo-
Walrasian’ ” (Lucas (various) Box 30, Correspondence 1977-79 folder). Nonetheless during 
his early years as an economist, although having a Walrasian predisposition, he did not work 
in this field. Lucas’s dissertation was applied work, an estimation of the degree of capital-
labor substitution in U.S. manufacturing. After getting a position at the Business School of 
                                                 
3 The following extract from an interview with Snowdon and Vance is one testimony amongst others: “Question 
[to Lucas]: You acknowledge that Friedman has had a great influence on you, yet his methodological approach 
is completely different to your own approach to macroeconomics. Why did his methodological approach not 
appeal to you? Answer: I like mathematics and general equilibrium theory. Friedman didn’t.... Question: His 
methodological approach seems more in keeping with Keynes and Marshall. Answer: He describes himself as 
Marshallian, although I don’t know quite what it means. Whatever it is, it’s not what I think of myself (Snowdon 
and Vane, 1998, p. 132).   3 
Carnegie Institute of Technology in 1963, he worked on the modeling of firms and industry 
dynamics  (a  partial-equilibrium  topic),  following  Jorgenson’s  approach  to  investment 
decisions.  
In his memoir, Lucas emphasizes that, when he was studying at the University of Chicago (as 
well as in the beginning of his time at Carnegie), he invested hardly any time in studying 
macroeconomics.
4  However,  Lucas  insists  that  he  had  no  antagonism  to  Keynesian 
economics: 
Everyone from Chicago is a Friedman student in some very basic sense, but in terms of 
macro, I claim that the credentials I’m describing are true-blue Keynesian. When I was 
done with my graduate education, how did I think of Keynesian economics? I didn’t 
think about it very deeply, to tell you the truth. It wasn’t my field. I didn’t picture 
myself as doing research in the area. But I certainly thought of myself as a Keynesian 
(2004, p. 19). 
This  declaration  should  not  be  understood  as  meaning  that  Lucas  was  a  ‘fundamentalist 
Keynesian’: “So, when I think of Keynesian economics or at least the Keynesian economics I 
signed on for, it was part of this econometric model-building tradition” (2004, p. 22). 
 
2. Lucas’s initial macroeconomics work 
The turning point in Lucas’s research interests came when many discussions with Leonard 
Rapping led them to write a joint paper that became the path breaking 1969 , “Real Wages, 
Employment,  and  Inflation”,  Journal  of  Political  article.  “We  got  there  [to 
macroeconomics] by the back door, through labor economics” (2001, p. 17). 
Triggered by the intense discussions about the Phillips relation that were taking place in the 
1960s, their paper studied the wage-employment sector of the broader IS-LM model. Lucas 
and Rapping wanted to reconcile short-period and long-period observations about the labor 
supply, which implied the adoption of a dynamic framework. They broke with traditional 
macroeconomics by adopting a microfoundations perspective, as well as by emphasizing the 
role of the supply of labor in explaining variations in employment. They depicted labor 
suppliers  as  rational  optimizing  agents  engaged  in  inter-temporal  substitution  —  that  is, 
working more when current wages were high relative to expected wages. The celebrated 
Lucas supply function ensued. The notion of inter-temporal substitution had gained pride of 
place in general equilibrium theory and in capital theory, but Lucas and Rapping were the 
first to apply it to labor supply. Subsequent developments have shown that this had far-
reaching consequences.  
                                                 
4 He took only the two required macroeconomics courses, taught by Christ and Baily, which centered on IS-LM 
modeling.   4 
Another original feature of their model was the adoption of the market-clearing assumption. 
In their paper, Lucas and Rapping trivialized its adoption by noting that some Keynesian 
models, such as Modigliani’s model, were also based on it. They ignored the fact that, for 
better or worse, this was certainly not the way in which Modigliani interpreted his model. 
Market clearing meant that no room was left for the notion of involuntary unemployment. 
This generated a big stir. 
Despite  being  a  perfectly  standard  formulation  of  labor  supply,  the  model  was 
controversial. The prevailing Keynesian approach had been to assume labor supply 
was  passive,  and  that  movements  in  the  demand  for  labor  determined  changes  in 
employment.  …  It  is  the  implication  that  changes  in  employment  may  be  largely 
voluntary that made the paper controversial (Fischer 1996, p. 14-15). 
Later on, Lucas was to consider market clearing as a compelling part of the equilibrium 
discipline.  However,  in  the  1969  article,  the  notion  was  presented  as  just  one  way  of 
proceeding: 
Patinkin is correct in asserting that that it is not necessary to construct models in which 
labor markets are continuously cleared, but, as his discussion of the Keynesian literature 
makes clear, the continuous-equilibrium view is in no sense a radical departure from the 
views of earlier theorists, not does it have, in itself, any obvious normative consequence 
(Lucas and Rapping, 1969; reprinted in Lucas, 1981a, p. 48, note 3). 
Apart  from  these  two  points,  the  paper  was  conventional.  It  was  based  on  adaptive 
expectations, and  adopted the Marshallian strategy of studying one sector of the economy in 
isolation from the others. Lucas claims that there was no doubt in his and Rappings’ minds 
that their specific model could be combined with other models concerned with other sectors 
of the economy: “We viewed ourselves as constructing a model of the ‘wage-price sector’, 
potentially suitable for combining with other models of other ‘sectors’ to provide a model of 
the entire economy” (1981a, p. 6). In the same vein, in Lucas’s retrospective papers, we 
recurrently  find  the  claim  that  their  aim  at  the  time  was  to  enrich  the  foundations  of 
Keynesian theory rather than to challenge them.
5 
In spite of these outwardly inclusive intentions, with their 1969 paper Lucas and Rapping 
(actually only Lucas, because Rapping soon lost interest in the subject) were set on a collision 
course with Keynesian macroeconomics.  
We thought of ourselves as engaged in a collective project which engaged efforts of many 
during  50’s  and  60’s  —  providing  ‘microeconomic  foundations’  for  Keynesian 
macroeconomic models. Many viewed ‘wage-price’ sector as last frontier in this effort. 
… Turned out that this work, in conjunction with similar efforts of others, was deeply 
                                                 
5 See Lucas (1981a, p. 3) and Lucas (2004, p. 20).   5 
subversive of Keynesian macroeconomics. [We] were led to complete rejection of this 
line and its policy implications, obliged to search for quite different ways of thinking 
about  business  cycle.  Surprisingly,  search  led  back  to  old-fashioned  pre-Keynesian 
theories — but without rejection of modern analytical methods (extract from a talk given 
by Lucas at Princeton in 1979, Lucas Archives Box 22).  
 
3. Rational expectations and general equilibrium  
By the end of the 60s, I was leading two lives as an economist. With Rapping, I was an 
empirical  macroeconomists,  estimating  Phillips  curves  and  aggregate  labor  supply 
functions. Working with Prescott, I had immersed myself in the mathematics of dynamic 
programming  and  general  equilibrium  theory  and  was  applying  these  methods  to 
construct tractable, genuinely dynamic models (Lucas 2001, p. 20).  
In his 1972 (1981a) ‘Expectations and the Neutrality of Money’ article, the end-result of the 
most  intensive  and  productive  years  of  his  career,  Lucas  proved  able  to  bring  these  two 
separate lines of research together.
6 This article is a development of the Lucas-Rapping 1969 
piece, retaining the idea of the equilibrium discipline (a term that had not been coined at the 
time) as well as the need to think inter-temporally, and hence use the notion of inter-temporal 
substitution as a cornerstone on which to build. However, it introduces three new elements. 
Rational expectations, a general equilibrium perspective are the first two, taking a stance in a 
policy  debate,  the  endorsement  of  Friedman’s  claim  about  the  inefficiency  of  monetary 
policy, is the third.  
Rational expectations 
Having  Muth  as  a  colleague  at  Carnegie,  Lucas  became  acquainted  with  the  rational-
expectations assumption at an early date, but, initially, he saw no way of exploiting it. In his 
Professional memoirs (2001, p. 13), he explains that the need to use this assumption dawned 
on him when, working on a paper on adjustment costs and the theory of supply, he came to 
realize that inconsistencies kept cropping up whenever myopic expectations, i.e. extrapolating 
the current price into the future, were assumed. This assumption resulted in firms missing 
profit opportunities which were visible to the model-builder. Such a discrepancy triggered 
Lucas’s realization that something was wrong: “If your theory reveals [unexploited] profit 
opportunities,  you  have  the  wrong  theory”  (Lucas  2001,  p.  13).  Lucas  adopted  rational 
                                                 
6 The speed with which Lucas changed his mind is striking. “In 1963, I had thought of a competitive industry in 
terms of firms solving short- and long-run, deterministic profit-maximization problems, under the (false) belief 
that current prices would maintain their current values forever, and with the passage from one to the other and all 
the effects of unpredictable shocks tacked on as afterthoughts. Five-years later, I thought of the same economics 
in terms of firms maximizing expect-discounted present value, with rational expectations about the probability 
distributions of future prices and with stochastic shocks and adjustment costs being fully integrated into theory” 
(Lucas 2001, p. 16).   6 
expectations in a paper co-authored with Prescott, “Investment Under Uncertainty” (Lucas 
and Prescott 1971), and then introduced it into the 1972 (1981a)  article.  
A general equilibrium approach 
Lucas credits Phelps with having drawn his attention to the need to adopt such a perspective 
when organizing a conference around what would become the celebrated ‘Phelps volume’ 
(Phelps, 1970).
7 Phelps was also responsible for having spelled out the island metaphor which 
was to provide Lucas with the signal-extraction idea in an imperfect-information context. 
Earlier on, Lucas had explored the technicalities of general equilibrium, participating in a 
workshop conducted by Uzawa and other activities. This was also the time at which he started 
“working  furiously  to  pick  up  the  mathematics  of  optimization  over  time  —  calculus  of 
variations, the maximum principle of Pontryagin, Bellman’s dynamic programming — and of 
the differential equations systems these optimization problems produced” (Lucas 2001, p. 14). 
While working with Prescott, who had been a graduate student at Carnegie when Lucas was 
an assistant professor there, the idea dawned on them that the Arrow-Debreu model had a 
previously unrecognized potential for applied work. “Prescott and I saw that it would be 
helpful to us, and plunged into a self-taught crash course. Putting the pieces together, we 
wrote ‘Investment under Uncertainty’ ” (Lucas 2001, p. 16).  
An endorsement of Friedman and Phelps 
Around the time that Lucas and Rapping’s paper was published there were two important 
developments  in  macroeconomics:  Friedman’s  Presidential  Address  introducing  the 
expectations-augmented  Phillips  curve  (Friedman,  1968),  and  Phelps’s  (1968)  Journal  of 
Political  Economy  article.  These  two  papers  introduced  the  notion  of  a  natural  rate  of 
unemployment, arguing that there was no long-run tradeoff between output and inflation. 
Although his address barely departed from the Keynesian framework, Friedman was able to 
augment the Phillips curve in such a way as to reverse its Keynesian conclusion that monetary 
policy could improve employment in a durable way into the opposite conclusion that it was 
ineffective in this respect, Quite a feat! As a result, two opposing interpretations and hence 
two  ‘camps’  were  present,  one  group  of  economists  defending  the  stable  Phillips  curve 
allowing for a trade-off between unemployment and inflation, the other arguing for the natural 
rate of unemployment hypothesis. This led Lucas to abandon his earlier project of enriching 
the IS-LM model, and to embark instead on the alternate aim of giving stronger foundations 
                                                 
7 “My most influential paper on ‘Expectations and the neutrality of money’ came out of a conference that Phelps 
organized where Rapping and I were invited to talk about our Phillips curve work. Phelps convinced us that we 
needed some kind of general equilibrium setting. Rapping and I were just focusing on labor supply decisions. 
Phelps kept on insisting that these labor suppliers are situated in some economy, and that you have to consider 
what the whole general equilibrium looks like, not just what the labor supply decision looks like” (Snowdon and 
Vane 1998, p. 126).   7 
to Friedman’s insights. To him, the Friedman paper was, at one and the same time, worth 
rallying to and in need of improvement, another task attempted in his 1972 paper.  
 
4. An equilibrium model of the business cycle 
The next step in Lucas’s intellectual development was the extension of the 1972 model into an 
explicit equilibrium analysis of the business cycle (Lucas [1975] 1981a). This involved less 
innovation  because  the  1972  expectations  model  was  already  about  an  economy  that 
“undergoes  what  is  in  some  sense  a  business  cycle”  (Lucas  1981a,  p.  8).  To  Lucas,  the 
possibility of such an easy (conceptually but not technically) extension of the earlier model 
was a testimony to its potentialities. The model claims that real output fluctuations are caused 
by  unanticipated  monetary-fiscal  shocks,  the  condition  for  this  to  happen  being  that 
production  and  trade  take  place  in  markets  that  are  physically  separated  and  that  agents’ 
information  is  imperfect,  the  framework  that  Lucas  had  adopted  in  his  “Expectations…” 
paper. 
This monetary-shock driven equilibrium model of the business cycle was soon criticized, 
Lucas himself gradually admitting to its shortcomings.
8 The important point was that the 
project  of  constructing  an  equilibrium  model  was  on  track,  and,  at  a  deeper  level,  that 
business  fluctuations,  rather  than  unemployment,  should  be  the  defining  object  of 
macroeconomics.
9  To  Lucas,  this  meant  a  return  to  a  line  of  enquiry  that  Hayek  had 
proposed, but which had been left unexplored as the result of the victory of the Keynesian 
program of studying involuntary unemployment at one point in time (Lucas [1977] 1981a, p. 
215).  
 
5. Lucas’s all-out attack on Keynesian macroeconomics 
Parallel  to  devising  a  new  way  of  doing  macroeconomic  analysis,  Lucas  became  highly 
critical of the traditional Keynesian approach. This led him to undertake an all-out offensive 
on Keynesian economics, incomparably harsher than Friedman’s. It evolved on two fronts, 
substance and polemics. I will present three substantive arguments from this attack, before 
turning to the polemical aspect.  
                                                 
8 “That ’75 paper was a dead end. I mean, it was attempt to introduce some kind of usual dynamics into my ’72 
paper, and it didn’t work. I think that Kydland and Prescott’s 1982 paper followed from that” (Lucas’s interview 
with Usabiaga 1999, p. 181)). 
9 “Our intention is … to extend the equilibrium methods which have been applied in many economic problems to 
cover a phenomenon which has so far resisted their application: the business cycle” Lucas and Sargent ([1979] 
1994, p. 28).   8 
Lucas’s dismissal of Keynes’s General Theory 
Keynes’s  General  Theory  was  hardly  Lucas’s  cup  of  tea.
10  More  substantively,  Lucas’s 
indictment was that Keynes departed from the equilibrium discipline by proposing his ill-
conceived  notion  of  involuntary  unemployment  (Lucas  and  Sargent,  [1978]  1994,  p.  15; 
Lucas,  [1977]  1981a,  p.  220;  Lucas  [1978]  1981a,  p.  242-243).  Keynes’s  lapse  from  the 
equilibrium discipline, Lucas was ready to admit, was understandable in view of the apparent 
contradiction between cyclical phenomena and economic equilibrium in the context of the 
Great Depression. Still, ex post it ought to be interpreted as having prompted a long detour in 
the progress of economic theory. It was an example of “bad social science: an attempt to 
explain important aspects of human behavior without reference either to what people like or 
what they are capable of doing” (Lucas, 1981a, p. 4).  
The ‘Lucas critique’ ([1976a] 1981a)  
Lucas’s  target  in  his  ‘Econometric  Policy  Evaluation:  A  Critique’  article  was  the 
macroeconometric models of the time, all of which had a Keynesian inspiration. Although 
admitting that they did a fairly good job of forecasting, these models, Lucas claimed, were a 
failure as far as the assessment of alternative policies was concerned. Their main flaw was 
their lack of microfoundations. Being based on reduced forms, these models missed the fact 
that agents would change their decisions when faced with a change in the institutional regime. 
In other words, they just recorded the decision rules used by agents, failing to go deeper and 
explore the agents’ objective functions. As a result, a model of the economy estimated at a 
period during which a particular institutional regime held sway could not provide adequate 
information for assessing behavior under a different regime.
11  
The stagflation experiment 
At the end of the 1960s, two distinct theories about the relation between the price level and 
employment (and at a deeper level about the efficiency of monetary policy) coexisted: the 
stable Phillips curve trade-off model and Friedman’s natural-rate-of-unemployment model. 
Lucas’s claim was that the 1970s phase of stagnation provided a quasi-laboratory experiment 
for their validity, and the Friedman model won the contest hands down. 
                                                 
10 Here is how he put it when interviewed by Klamer: “I find it [The General Theory] carelessly written, not 
especially graciously written, sometimes dishonestly written. I don’t like the bullying tone. I don’t like the sort 
of British aristocratic stuff” (Klamer, 1984, p. 50). 
11 Lucas has been keen to insist that this critique follows from the argument he developed in the ‘Expectations’  
article.  “If  the  theory  of  ‘Expectations  and  the  Neutrality  of  Money’  was  the  correct  way  to  formulate  the 
Friedman-Phelps natural-rate hypothesis, then it was evident that the econometric methods then being applied to 
test  this  hypothesis  were  entirely  missing  the  point”  (Lucas,  1981a,  p.  9).  “In  that  model  economy  [of 
‘Expectations and the Neutrality of Money’], it is evident that changes in the rules governing monetary policy 
alter coefficients in what one would ordinarily have thought of as structural equations in the econometric sense, 
regardless  of  the  stability  of  these  coefficients  over  a  past  sample  period.  Once  the  reasons  for  this  are 
understood, it is not difficult to see that the same parameter instability must arise in the actual economy” (Lucas, 
1981a, p. 11).   9 
Keynesian theory is in deep trouble, the deepest kind of trouble in which an applied 
body of theory can find itself: It appears to be giving serious wrong answers to the most 
basic  questions  of  macroeconomic  policy.  Proponents  of  a  class  of  models  which 
promised  3½  to  4½  percent  unemployment  to  a  society  willing  to  tolerate  annual 
inflation rates of 4 to 5 percent have some explaining to do after a decade such as we 
have just come through. A forecast error of this magnitude and central importance to 
policy has consequences, as well it should. (Lucas, 1981b, p. 559-560). 
We  got  the  high-inflation  decade,  and  with  it  as  clear-cut  an  experimental 
discrimination as macroeconomics is very likely to see, and Friedman and Phelps were 
right. (Lucas, 1981b, p. 560).
12  
The polemical dimension  
Unlike Friedman, whose criticisms of Keynesian theory were usually embedded in flattering 
wording, Lucas did not pull his punches. Two examples are worth giving. The first is Lucas 
and Sargent’s joint contribution to a Conference organized by the Federal Reserve Bank of 
Boston  in  June  1978  (Lucas  and  Sargent  [1978]  1994).  Entitled  “After  Keynesian 
Macroeconomics”, it was a strongly argued paper cutting deep into the Keynesian paradigm. 
But its rhetoric was virulent. The paper drew strong criticism from Benjamin Friedman, the 
discussant (Friedman 1978). Never short of mischievous comparisons, Solow, who had been 
asked  to  give  the  concluding  remarks,  found  Lucas  and  Sargent’s  “polemical  vocabulary 
reminiscent of Spiro Agnew” (Solow 1978, p. 203), finding the following phrases offensive: 
“wildly  incorrect”,  “fundamentally  flawed”,  “wreckage”,  “failure”,  “fatal”,  “of  no  value”, 
“dire implications”, failure on a grand scale”, “spectacular recent failure”, “no hope” (Solow, 
1978, p. 204).
13 
My second example is a talk given by Lucas in 1979 at the Graduate School of Chicago’s 
Annual  Management  Conference.  Entitled  “The  Death  of  Keynesian  Economics”,  it  was 
published in the alumni magazine, Issues and Ideas, in 1980. It starts as follows: 
The main development I want to discuss has already occurred: Keynesian economics is 
dead — maybe ‘disappeared’ is a better term. I do not exactly know when this happened 
but it is true today and it was not true two years ago. This is a sociological not an 
economic observation, so evidence for it is sociological. For example, one cannot find a 
                                                 
12 See also Lucas ([1977] 1981a, p. 221). 
13 Lucas and Sargent reacted strongly to Friedman’s comments by declaring that he focused on minor points and 
their ‘rhetorical profile’ instead of rebutting their main arguments. “The ‘rhetorical profile’ adopted in our paper 
was not chosen independently of the arguments developed using more precise and technical language in the text, 
and more fully developed by each of us in earlier writings. … If this research is flawed in some essential way, it 
is difficult to see how softening our rhetoric will help matters. If the implications we have drawn are close to the 
mark,  how  can  ‘the  cause  of  scientific  interchange’  be  best  served  by  summarizing  them  in  a  way  which 
averages what we believe to be true with what others find pleasant or familiar?” (Lucas and Sargent, 1979, p. 
82).   10 
good, under-40 economist who identifies himself, works as ‘Keynesian’. Indeed, people 
even take offence if referred to in this way. At research seminars, people do not take 
Keynesian theorizing seriously any more —audience starts to whisper, giggles to one 
another.  Leading  journals  are  not  getting  Keynesian  papers  submitted  any  more.  I 
suppose I, and with many others, were in on the kill in an intellectual sense, but I do not 
say this as any kind of boast, even with much pleasure. Just a fact. True, there are still 
leading  Keynesians  —  in  academics  and  government  circles  —  so  Keynesian 
economics is alive in this sense — but this is transient, because there is no fresh source 
of supply. Only way to produce a sixty year old Keynesian is to produce a thirty year 
old Keynesian, and wait thirty years. So implications for policy will take a while to be 
evident — but they can be very accurately predicted.  
This blunt passage has been posted on the internet on several occasions in the last years as a 
charge against Lucas.
 However, getting hold of the full paper proved to be difficult. My 
requests to the people who had posted the passage for a copy of it were always met with the 
answer that they had none! Lucas gave me a similar answer.
 So the passage, cut loose from 
the rest of the paper, achieved a life on its own.
14 Luckily, I was able to find a draft version of 
the paper in the Lucas Archives at Duke (various, Box 22).
15 When reading it in full, a rather 
different picture emerges. In particular, it turns out that its real subject matter is the demise of 
the neoclassical synthesis. 
The idea of a neoclassical synthesis, introduced by Samuelson in 1955 in the third edition of 
his Economics textbook, covers a multi-faceted reality. It has a sociological dimension in its 
description of a modus vivendi between the two communities of micro- and macroeconomists. 
It also refers to a theoretical program, already introduced in Samuelson’s Foundations (1947), 
aimed  at  bringing  together  Walrasian  and  Keynesian  theory,  the  domain  of  long-period 
equilibrium being assigned to the former, and that of short-period disequilibrium to the latter. 
In practice, this program had not been achieved, but this failure was hardly recognized.  
Lucas’s purpose in his lecture was to ponder upon the ideological function played by the 
neoclassical synthesis. He viewed it as having arisen as a by-product of the Great Depression, 
which had led to a widespread loss of faith in market forces, and its replacement by the belief 
that the economy needed to be managed on a year-to-year basis. Lucas’s story is so vivid that 
it is best to quote him directly:  
The central message of Keynes was that there existed a middle ground between the 
extremes of socialism and laissez faire capitalism. … True that economy cannot be left 
to its own device, but all that we need to do to manage it is to manipulate the general 
                                                 
14 Mankiw quotes it in his paper, “The Macroeconomists as a Scientist and an Engineer” (2006, p. 34). In Google 
Scholar, it is mentioned as being quoted thirty-five times, but the paper itself is listed as unavailable. 
15 The above excerpt is drawn from this draft version. I have slightly amended it by ingsuppress abbreviations.   11 
level of fiscal and monetary policy. If this is done right, all that elegant 19
th century 
economics will be valid and individual markets can be left to take care of themselves. In 
effect, Samuelson told his colleagues: “Face it — you live in a world where virtually 
nobody has any faith in this laissez faire religion of yours. I am offering a substitute 
ideology which concedes the inability of a competitive economy to take care of itself, 
but which also offers a management system which is, say, 95% consistent with laissez 
faire”. These were hard times, and this was too good a deal to pass up. We took it. So 
did society as a whole. What I meant by saying that Keynesian economics is dead at the 
beginning of my talk is just that this middle ground is dead. Not because people do not 
like the middle ground anymore but because its intellectual rationale has eroded to the 
point where it is no longer serviceable (Lucas Archives Box 22, Lucas’s emphasis). 
By his own admission, Lucas played a crucial role in this erosion since his work showed that 
the new synthesis program was unachievable from the intellectual point of view.
16 To Lucas, 
this conclusion was good news, good riddance to a mistaken line of research. Intellectually, 
nothing was lost since the dismissal of the neoclassical synthesis was accompanied by the 
realization  that  classical  theory  alone  could  tackle  that  part  of the  explanandum  that  had 
previously been assigned to Keynesian theory. Nonetheless, he reckoned that this collapse led 
to a feeling of disarray, a painful loss of consensus among macroeconomists.  
Had Lucas entitled his lecture ‘The fall of the neoclassical synthesis’ instead of ‘The death of 
Keynesian economics’ (and had he deleted its first paragraph) not only would it have caused 
less outrage, but the title would have been more accurate. In effect, the ‘Keynesian’ modifier 
(and the term ‘Keynesianism’) can have two meanings. First, they can designate a specific 
vision of the ideal organization of society, i.e. a limited belief in the supremacy of market 
forces,  the  effect  of  which  is  to  assign  governments  the  auxiliary  role  of  engaging  in 
stabilization  policies.  Keynes  pinpointed  this  as  a  “moderately  conservative’  viewpoint 
(Keynes 1936, p.377). Second, they can indicate the Keynesian conceptual apparatus, which 
to all intents and purposes can be identified with the IS-LM model and associated with the 
neoclassical  synthesis.  This  is  Keynesianism  as  a  theory,  and, for  that  matter,  Keynesian 
macroeconomics. Whenever these meanings are not separated, confusion occurs. 
In  the  light  of  this  distinction,  it turns  out that  that  Lucas’s  judgment in  his  lecture  was 
basically  correct  for  Keynesianism  as  a  conceptual  apparatus,  but  wide  off  the  mark  for 
Keynesianism  as  a  vision  of  the  market  system.  Oddly  enough,  Lucas  had  made  this 
                                                 
16 Lucas, himself, claimed that his theory was not responsible for the fall of the neoclassical synthesis but was 
rather a reaction to it. “[Tobin’s negative reaction] reflects the view that ‘new classical’ models are a cause of 
the decay in confidence in the neoclassical synthesis, as opposed to a response to what I see as the failure of 
Keynesian models to deal with events in the 1970s” (Lucas, 1981b, pp. 562-3).   12 
distinction a few years earlier in his review of McCracken et al.’s “Towards Full Employment 
and Price Stability” OECD report (Lucas [1976b] 1981a).
17 
To  sum  up,  the  ‘Death  of  Keynesianism’  lecture  is  akin  to  the  ‘After  Keynesian 
macroeconomics’ paper, although it operates at a different level of technicality. Both make a 
well-argued substantive claim, but wrap it up in such provocative wording that it inevitably 
caused vehement outrage.  
6. The passing of the baton to Kydland and Prescott 
As hinted above, Lucas gradually admitted that his own equilibrium business-cycle model did 
not hold water. Here is how he put it in his Professional Memoir: 
Though I did not see it at the time, the Bald Peak conference [organized by the Federal 
Reserve Bank of Boston in 1978] also marked the beginning of the end for my attempts 
to account for the business cycle in terms of monetary shocks. At that conference, Ed 
Prescott presented a model of his and Finn Kydland’s that was a kind mixture of Brock 
and Mirman’s model of growth subject to stochastic technology shocks and my model 
of  monetary  shocks.  When  Ed  presented  his  results,  everyone  could  see  they  were 
important but the paper was so novel and complicated that no one could see exactly 
what  they  were.  Later  on,  as  they  gained  more  experience  through  numerical 
simulations of their Bad Peak model, Kydland and Prescott found that the monetary 
shocks were just not pulling their weight: by removing all monetary aspects of the 
theory they obtained a far simpler and more comprehensible structure that fit postwar 
U.S. time series data just as well as the original version (Lucas 2001, p. 28). 
In  effect,  Kydland  and  Prescott’s  1982  real-business-cycle  model  (Kydland  and  Prescottt 
1982)  became  the  workhorse  of  macroeconomics  in  the  late  1980s  and  1990s.  The 
relationship  between  Lucas,  and  Kydland  and  Prescott,  is,  I  surmise,  reminiscent  of  that 
between Keynes and his followers. What would have happened to the General Theory if its 
message had not been transposed into the IS-LM model, and if Klein had not extended this 
model into an econometric framework? While no answer can be provided to such a question, 
it reminds us that, in a field such as economics, there is no single inevitable way for theory to 
evolve. The same questions arises over the relationship between Lucas, on the one hand, and 
Kydland and Prescott, on the other. Without Kydland and Prescott, would the seismic change 
that macroeconomics underwent have occurred? It is far from certain. Lucas’s conceptual 
papers  were  impressive  but  too  abstract  to  generate  a  huge  following.  As  to  Lucas’s 
                                                 
17  “It  seems  certain  that  Keynes’s  thought  will  continue  to  stimulate  economic  theorists  in  various  and 
unpredictable  ways  for  the  foreseeable  future,  so  much  that  many  economists  will  think  of  themselves  as 
‘Keynesians’. In advance of seeing these developments, one cannot presume to pronounce them failed. I am here 
using  the  term  ‘Keynesian’  much  more  narrowly,  to  refer  to  the  multiplier  calculation,  which  all  of  us 
understood Heller to be discussing and applying, together with the underlying, if less precisely specified, theory 
which provided guidance as to the range of circumstances under which these calculations might be expected to 
yield accurate answers” (Lucas [1976b] 1981a, pp. 265-66).    13 
criticisms, their impact on the profession could have been limited to making modelers more 
cautious about drawing practical conclusions from their models, without producing a radical 
change in method. To generate a scientific revolution, an alternative way of doing applied 
work, providing new grist to the mill for the majority of members of the community, must be 
made available. This was Kydland and Prescott’s main contribution. 
 
7. Stage seven: after the victory 
In  his  Professional  Memoir,  when  discussing  the  Bald  Peak  Colony  Club  Conference 
mentioned above, Lucas depicts himself as a rebel fighting the establishment (2001, p. 26). It 
did not take long before the positions were reversed. Frequent invitations to comment on the 
history of macroeconomics accompanied Lucas’s new status, and he cannot be faulted for 
shirking this responsibility! By doing so, he was led to take the role of the commentator of the 
theoretical innovations he had impulsed. 
Lucas’s ‘Methods and Problems in Business Cycle Theory’ article  
In  his  article  entitled  ‘Methods  and  Problems  in  Business  Cycle  Theory’,  Lucas 
([1980] 1981a) aimed to elucidate the factors explaining the rise of equilibrium business-cycle 
models. He considered three possible factors (technical developments, outside events and the 
internal  development  of  the  discipline),  and  concluded  that  the  first  of  these  played  the 
dominant  role.  Progress  in  macroeconomics  has  mainly  been  a  matter  of  discovering  or 
applying  new  tools,  new  techniques  for  treating  old  issues. 
18  With  respect  to  the 
transformation of macroeconomics, two technical innovations were particularly important: the 
use of new mathematical tools, borrowed from engineering; and the increased computational 
ability associated with the tremendous progress that had taken place in computer science, 
paving  the  way  for  large-scale  simulation  work.  It  is  their  absence  that  explains  earlier 
theoretical stalemates. Taking Keynes’s Treatise on Money, the aim of which was to construct 
a theory of the business cycle, as an example, Lucas notes that:  
The difficulty is that Keynes has no apparatus for dealing with these problems. Though 
he discusses them verbally as well as his contemporaries, neither he nor anyone else 
was well enough equipped technically to move  the discussion to a sharper or more 
productive level (Lucas [1980] 1981a, p. 275). 
                                                 
18 The same point is expressed more lyrically in ‘My Keynesian Education’: “I see the progressive development 
in economics as entirely technical: better mathematics, better mathematical formulation, better data, better data-
processing methods, better statistical methods, better computational methods. I think of all progress in economic 
thinking, in the kind of basic core of economic theory, as developing entirely as learning how to do what Hume 
and Smith and Ricardo wanted to do, only better: more empirically founded, more powerful solution methods, 
and so on” (Lucas, 2004, p. 22). See also Lucas ([1980] 1981a, p. 275), Lucas (1987, p. 2), and Lucas (1996, p. 
669).   14 
As to new developments “thrown at us by the real world” (Lucas [1980] 1981a, p. 272), Lucas 
dislikes giving them too much importance because this would run counter to his premise that 
all business cycles are basically alike.
19 He nonetheless considers two external influences that 
may have played a role in the rise of new classical macroeconomics. The first, already evoked 
above, is the stagflation period that characterized the 1970s. In this paper, however, unlike 
some of his others, Lucas stops short of claiming that this was the decisive factor in the 
theoretical transformation ([1980] 1981a, pp. 282-283). The second is the fact that in the post-
World War II period, business cycles have followed a fairly regular pattern, giving weight to 
the view that they are a repeated occurrence of the ‘same’ event.  
As  far  as  internal  developments  are  concerned,  Lucas  emphasizes  the  usefulness  of 
connecting theoretical elements that at first look remote, and in particular of importing ideas 
from neo-Walrasian theory into macroeconomics. These two fields were previously isolated 
from  each  other.  To  illustrate  this  point,  Lucas  returns  to  the  topic  of  the  neoclassical 
synthesis,  this  time  broaching  it  in  its  technical,  rather  than  its  ideological,  aspect.  The 
neoclassical  synthesis  rested  on  an  old-style  interpretation  of  Walrasian  theory,  where 
equilibrium is conceived of as a static, or state of rest, notion, acting as a center of gravity for 
disequilibrium  states.
20  Such  a  conception  of  equilibrium,  intertwining  equilibrium  and 
disequilibrium,  has  many  disadvantages  (for  example,  it  cannot  account  for  irreversible 
changes in the data), but the drawback to which Lucas seems to be most sensitive is the 
arbitrariness of the speed of adjustment. That is, it is up the economist to decide on the speed, 
to the effect that he or she can give as much or as little importance to disequilibrium as he or 
she cares. To Lucas, this is a poor conception of dynamics. But macroeconomists of the time, 
he argues in this paper, should not be blamed for adopting it. They could not do better, first, 
because they lacked the technical tools and, second, because the usefulness of borrowing from 
neo-Walrasian  theory,  as  distinct  from  the  traditional  interpretation  of  Walras,  had  not 
dawned  on  them.  Taking  these  steps,  as  Lucas  did,  leads  to  the  introduction  of  new 
equilibrium concepts to the effect that “the idea that an economic system in equilibrium is in 
any sense ‘at rest’ is simply an anachronism” (Lucas ([1980] 1981a p. 287). Once the new 
trail had been blazed, the old path ought to be abandoned. In Lucas’s superb metaphor: 
To ask why the monetary theorists of the 1940s did not make use of the contingent-
claim view of equilibrium is, it seems to me, like asking why Hannibal did not use tanks 
against the Romans instead of elephants ([1980] 1981a, p. 286).  
                                                 
19 Lucas admits that the Great Depression remains a “formidable barrier to a completely unbending application 
of the view that business cycles are all alike” (Lucas ([1980] 1981a, p. 273).  
20 “I refer to this theory [the neoclassical synthesis] as static.... The underlying idea seems to be taken from 
physics, as referring to a system “at rest.” In economics, I suppose such a static equilibrium corresponds to a 
prediction as to how an economy would behave should external shocks remain fixed over a long period, so that 
households and firms would adjust to facing the same set of prices over and over again and attune their behavior 
accordingly” (Lucas, ([1980] 1981a, p. 278).   15 
A different assessment of Keynes’s contribution to economics? 
It may be wondered whether Lucas’s judgment of Keynes mellowed after he had joined him 
in the pantheon of great economists. The answer is nuanced. As far as the issue of Keynes’s 
contribution to economic theory is concerned, Lucas has stuck to his view that Keynes was a 
poor technical economist. However, he has also insisted that, in the 1930s, Keynes played a 
crucial positive role in the ideological sphere by helping to ensure the survival of democratic 
capitalism, which was threatened at the time.  
I think Keynes’s actual influence as a technical economist is pretty close to zero, and it 
has been close to zero for 50 years. Keynes was not a very good technical economist. 
He didn’t contribute much to the development of the field. (Interview with Usabiaga 
Ibanez, 1999, p. 180). 
 [Keynes’s real contribution] is not Einstein-level theory, new paradigm, all this. … I 
think that in writing the General Theory, Keynes was viewing himself as a spokesman 
for a discredited profession. … He is writing in a situation where people are ready to 
throw  in  the  towel  on  capitalism  and  liberal  democracy  and  go  with  fascism  or 
corporatism,  protectionism,  socialist  planning.  Keynes’s  first  objective  is  to  say, 
‘Look,  there’s  got  to  be  a  way  to  respond  to  depressions  that’s  consistent  with 
capitalist democracy’. What he hits on is that the government should take some new 
responsibilities, but the responsibilities are for stabilizing overall spending flows. You 
don’t have to plan the economy in detail to meet this objective. … So, I think this was 
a great political achievement. … [Keynes] was a political activist from beginning to 
end. What he was concerned about when he wrote the General Theory was convincing 
people that there was a way to deal with the Depression that was forceful and effective 
but didn’t involve scrapping the capitalist system. Maybe we could have done without 
him but I’m glad we didn’t have to try (2004, p. 24).
21 
Lucas’s ‘My Keynesian Education’ lecture 
In 2003, Lucas gave a lecture given at Duke University at a Conference on the IS-LM 
model. It made a strong impression on many in the audience. First Lucas admitted to the 
limits of the real-business-cycle type of modeling.
22 These models, he stated, were a fine 
tool  for  understanding  business  fluctuations  in  periods  of  plain  sailing,  but  were 
inappropriate for coming to grips with big depressions or financial crises. Second, as the last 
quotation above illustrates, Lucas eulogized Keynes for having contributed through his work 
to  the  survival  of  capitalism  and  liberal  democracy  in  the  face  of  the  dual  threat  from 
fascism and communism. Moreover, Lucas admitted that Keynes had  made the important 
                                                 
21 See also Lucas (1995, pp. 916-917). 
22 Lucas had already made this point in his anniversary review of the Friedman-Schwartz book on the monetary 
history of the US (Lucas 1994).   16 
policy claim that spending flows should be stabilized, a claim which, Lucas said he agreed 
with, adding that the real question was how to do it (2004, p. 24). Finally, Lucas declared 
that he had also had his Keynesian years, which he evoked fondly. He had already made this 
claim in passim in his Professional Memoir (2001), but now it was expressed in a more 
resonant way. 
What exactly did Lucas have in mind when speaking of his Keynesian years? Did he refer to 
Keynesianism as a vision of the working of the market system or as a conceptual apparatus? 
As a vision of the working of the market, Lucas’s reminiscences about his Keynesian years 
means that there was a time when he shared this vision. In his Professional Memoir, he makes 
it clear that political discussions abounded in his family and that a left-of-center viewpoint 
dominated. He may have retained these ideas when he entered graduate school, before shifting 
towards  more  free-market  views,  possibly  under  Friedman’s  influence  and  the  general 
atmosphere in Chicago. As a conceptual apparatus, the ‘Keynesian years’ refers to the short 
time when Lucas worked with Rapping on the wage-employment sector of an IS-LM model. 
For my purposes, the two interpretations amount to the same thing. They both indicate that 
Lucas initially had nothing against Keynesian theory, either ideologically or theoretically.  
If this is accepted, the lecture was more than a gratuitous reminiscence about past days. It 
served the purpose of making the point that Lucas’s dissatisfaction with Keynesian theory, 
rather of being due to some a priori antagonism, happened despite his Keynesian inclination, 
as a result of his having worked with the theory and uncovered its flaws. Had he admitted that 
he had always been anti-Keynesian, his criticism could have been dismissed as purely based 
on prejudice.
 23  
Lucas’s rejection of the scientific revolution interpretation 
Another of Lucas’s recurrent themes is his lack of sympathy for interpreting the unfolding of 
macroeconomics (or for that matter economics in general) in terms of the Kuhnian notion of a 
scientific revolution. To him, little, if anything, is gained by invoking such a framework. 
Research in my field of specialization — macroeconomics, or monetary and business 
cycle theory — has undergone rapid change in the past 15 years. One way of describing 
some  of  these  changes  is  in  terms  of  ideological  contests  between  rival  schools  of 
thought:  the  ‘Keynesian  revolution’,  the  ‘monetarist  counter-revolution’,  and  so  on. 
                                                 
23 We can, I believe, safely extend to Lucas the following observation that Sargent made about himself in an 
interview with Sent: “But  isn’t  the case that  what  you define as a problem depends on what your  starting 
position is? Absolutely.  That’s  exactly why rational  expectations stuff was developed by people within the 
Keynesian tradition. There were people trying to knock off and destroy the Keynesian tradition from the outside, 
who weren’t sympathetic enough to it to learn it. And I mean it was the monetarist tradition or something like 
that. And the paradox is that, I would say what’s ended up being perceived as the most destructive in Keynesian 
tradition is from its own children. You know? Because, if you look at what, say Lucas, Prescott, Wallace, and 
Barro were working on, those were all pieces of a Keynesian model, a high-tech Keynesian style” (Sent 1998, 
pp. 165-166).   17 
There is no doubt something to be learned by tracing the main ideological currents in 
macroeconomic research, but I myself find most of this discussion of crises, revolutions 
and  so  on,  unintelligible,  and  almost  wholly  unconnected  with  the  most  interesting 
current research (Lucas 1987, p. 1).
24 
It is true that the notion of a scientific revolution has been overused. Still, if there is one 
episode in the history of macroeconomics which seems to deserve the appellation, it is the 
transformation triggered by Lucas’s work. It has all the trappings of a change in paradigm: a 
shift in the object of analysis, a shift from the alleged neglect of microfoundations to allotting 
them a central role, the replacement of Keynesian concepts with new ones, unheard of before 
(such  as  rational  expectations  and  inter-temporal  substitution),  the  introduction  of  a  new 
dynamic perspective putting an end to the neoclassical-synthesis perspective, a change in the 
equilibrium notion, and a move away from a Marshallian and towards a Walrasian approach. 
From the sociological point of view, the picture also fits: thundering declarations of war, the 
displacement of the stars of the profession by new idols, the publication of new journals, etc.   
None of this impresses Lucas. Nor, I suspect, would he be seduced by Axel Leijonhufvud’s 
account of the development of macroeconomics using a decision-tree metaphor.
25 According 
to Leijonhufvud, progress along a branch of the tree may come to an end because more or less 
insuperable puzzles  arise, or because objections leveled against it persuade researchers to 
abandon  this  approach.  The  Lucasian  transformation  is  a  case  in  point.  Keynesian 
macroeconomics seemed to be alive and well. Lucas and a few other troublemakers came 
along, declaring that it was plagued with inconsistencies and methodological flaws. They 
engaged in a backtracking process, returning to an earlier node at which they felt the wrong 
turning  had  been  taken.  Another  approach,  which  for  one  reason  or  another  had  looked 
impracticable at an earlier date, suddenly turns out to be appealing and worth exploring.
26  
Two  reasons  may  explain  Lucas’s  reluctance  to  endorse  the  Kuhnian  or  Leijonhufvud 
explanations. The first is that, to him, the transformation is unequivocal progress. In both the 
Kuhnian  and  the  Leijonhufvud  models,  progress  is  relative.  The  decision-tree  approach 
                                                 
24 See also Klamer (1984, p. 50). 
25 “It is useful to think of the history of our subject as forming a decision tree. Major economists force their 
contemporaries to face choices – the choice of what to ask, what to assume, what to regard as evidence and what 
methods and models to employ – and persuade the profession or some fraction of it to follow the choice they 
make. The path that any particular school has followed traces a sequence of such decisions. Many of the choices 
faced in such a sequence were not anticipated by the founder to which we trace the development in question but 
were created by subsequent contributors; some of the decisions made we may judge to have been wrong in 
hindsight” (Leijonhufvud 1994, p. 148). 
26 The following extract from the introduction to Studies in Business Cycle Theory shows that Lucas did indeed 
practice backtracking: “The apparent novelty of the model of ‘Expectations and the neutrality of money’ … 
renewed  my  interest  in  the  vast  pre-Keynesian  literature  on  business-cycle  theory.  There  I  found  …  a 
sophisticated literature, however unaided by modern theoretical technology, emphasizing the recurrent character 
of business cycles, the necessity of viewing these recurrences as mistakes, and attempts  to rationalize these 
mistakes  as  intelligent  responses  to  movements  in  nominal  ‘signals’  of  movements  in  the  underlying  ‘real’ 
events we care about and want to react to” (Lucas, 1981a, p. 9).   18 
incorporates the idea of progress only within the confines of a given research route.
27 When a 
scientific revolution (i.e. a radical backtracking) occurs, the winners claim that returning to a 
previous  node  and  taking  a  different  track  constitutes  progress.  By  the  same  taken,  they 
declare that the earlier paradigm was, if not a dead end, at least a detour. But the mere fact 
that one scientific revolution has occurred creates the possibility of another, with the new 
winners engaging in the same dismissive discourse about the previous line of research. This is 
not the monotonic view of progress that Lucas seems to espouse. The second reason that he 
rejects this approach is that he dislikes the idea of ‘school’ or a ‘paradigm’. To him, they are 
ideological entities, and reasoning in terms of such notions is unproductive.  
 
Concluding remarks 
The aim of this paper has been to document the different steps by which Lucas moved away 
from  Keynesian  macroeconomics  to  become  the  leading  figure  in  a  new  approach  to 
macroeconomics.  To  the  best  of  my  knowledge,  such  a  task  has  not  previously  been 
addressed. Having documented the stages, there are several paths along which the research 
could continue. The first is to critically assess Lucas’s account. I find Lucas’s narration of his 
intellectual journey honest and highly instructive. Nonetheless, in view of his stakeholder 
position, we cannot accept it uncritically. The fact that he took the trouble to write these meta-
theoretical papers witnesses to his interest in setting the record straight for future historians. 
To get the full picture, complementary investigations are now needed to compare Lucas’s 
account with other testimonies and available documents.
28 A second possible line of research 
is to enter into a discussion about the validity of the often blunt, views expressed by Lucas in 
the papers under review – for example, his assessment of Keynesian theory. Finally, a critical 
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